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Countries have diﬀerent comparative advantages in quality. These might
be due to technological diﬀerences, or to reputation diﬀerences of the sort
described in Klein & Leﬄer (1981). Reputation diﬀerences are particularly
interesting, since good reputations are a form of “social capital” that is
amenable to modelling. They can explain why ﬁrms in these industries like
to export even if the foreign price is no higher than the domestic one, and
why governments would like to have large “high- value” sectors.
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11. Introduction
Diﬀerences in the productiveness of countries is a major theme— the
major theme?— in both international economics and development economics.
In both ﬁelds, the most basic models are those in which countries either
have diﬀerent technologies available, or the same technologies but diﬀerent
endowments of factors of production. Diﬀerent endowments and technologies
are suﬃcient to build theoretical models for why countries trade and why
some countries are richer than others, but they do not leave us satisﬁed. The
United States and India do not trade just because India has more labor and
less capital, and India is not poorer just because it does not have access to
American patents. In particular, the question of why the most advanced
technology does not spread to every country is a nagging one, the subject of
the entire literature surveyed in 2004 by Wolfgang Keller for the Journal of
Economic Literature.
Another class of diﬀerences between countries is institutions. Most ob-
vious of these is the quality of a country’s government, including not only its
economic policies, but its degree of corruption, the quality of administration,
its provision of public goods, and the reliability of its courts. Much recent
work, including notably La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1998)
and Acemoglu, Johnson & Robinson (2002) has suggested that diﬀerences in
institutions can explain trade and backwardness. Institutional diﬀerences
extend beyond just the government, however. The idea of “social capital”
has tried to get at the importance not just of government institutions, but of
private institutions. The literature is large, including such works as Knack &
Keefer (1997), La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer & Vishny (1997), Putnam
(2000), and Routledge & von Amsberg (2003) . Some of the attention has
been on public institutions that overcome problems of asymmetric informa-
tion, opportunism, and simple theft; other work looks at private institutions
(e.g., Rauch & Trindade [2002] on how networks of overseas Chinese result in
increased trade between countries). In law-and-economics, a similarly large
literature has developed around the topic of “law and norms” to explain why
formal law so often seems to be unimportant in determining behavior. For a
survey, see McAdams & Rasmusen (2004).
2The present paper takes an approach to trade based not so much on for-
m a lo ri n f o r m a li n s t i t u t i o n sa so nd i ﬀerences in expectations, something akin
to the role of “trust” in the part of the social capital literature exempliﬁed
by Putnam (2000). The courts are never suﬃcient in themselves to protect
parties to a bargain from being cheated in small ways. Macaulay (1963)
pointed out long ago that in the ordinary course of dealing, businesses rely
not so much on the courts as on industry custom and, most importantly, on
reputation. A ﬁrm honors its commitments, not just in letter but in spirit,
because it wants to keep its good reputation. Klein & Leﬄer (1981) put
this in economic terms. If a ﬁrm can charge a premium for a high-quality
product, then even if it could get away with cutting corners in the short run
because courts cannot enforce subtle cheating in quality, it will choose to
deal honestly with its customers. The reason need not be simple integrity:
it can be the result of selﬁsh proﬁt maximization. If the ﬁrm does cheat, it
will lose repeat business, and if it can charge a price high enough to earn
economic proﬁts from its reputation and it cares enough about future proﬁts
it will refrain from taking the short-run gain from cheating. Buyers, know-
ing this, are willing to pay a premium price, which is what gives the ﬁrm
its economic proﬁt. This, however, is just one possible equilibrium, one set
of self-fulﬁlling expectations. Another equilibrium is for buyers not to trust
promises of quality and to refuse to pay premium prices. The sellers, in turn,
then have no incentive to provide high quality.
When there are multiple equilibria, it is quite possible to have identical
technologies and endowments but diﬀerent outcomes. One outcome is high
quality, proﬁtable ﬁrms, and consumers earning surplus from buying high
quality at premium prices. The other outcome is low quality, zero-proﬁt
ﬁrms, and less consumer surplus— indeed, the possibility that the industry
vanishes completely because consumers would rather buy nothing than buy
low quality at low prices. While much of the development literature has been
about rapacious, self-defeating governments with incentive that ruin their
own attempts to proﬁt from their citizens, the Klein-Leﬄer model is about
rapacious, self-defeating ﬁrms with incentives that ruin their own attempts
to proﬁt from their customers. Instead of the trick being to change the
3structure of government so as to reduce rent-seeking, the trick becomes to
change expectations in the product markets, an equally diﬃcult task— but
one in which international trade might help. The present paper will explore
t h ei m p l i c a t i o n so ft h e s em u l t i p l ee q u ilibria, transferring the Klein- Leﬄer
model to international trade.
Quality has been studied in a number of models of international trade.
Flam & Helpman (1987) construct a model of North-South trade in which the
North has a technological advantage in producing high quality, but products
are diﬀerentiated and both high and low quality will be produced and traded
in equilibrium. The “technology model” of the present paper can be seen
as a simple version of this, without product diﬀerentiation. More similar to
the technology model is Murphy & Shleifer (1997), which uses a one-factor,
two-good model to make the point that richer countries may have a taste
for higher-quality goods, so in equilibrium we will see eﬃcient diﬀerences in
quality between goods consumed in diﬀerent countries.
The word “quality” has been most often used in recent years in models
along the lines of in Grossman & Helpman’s 1992 book. There, intermediate
goods vary in quality, and innovation and technological diﬀusion allows that
quality to increase, good by good. Moreover, trade in those intermediate
g o o d sa i d sd i ﬀusion of the superior technology. In the present model, the
emphasis will not be on how quality improves, whether in one country or
by diﬀusion, but on how diﬀering quality aﬀects trade. Moreover, the most
interesting results will depend on quality being unobservable before purchase,
an issue absent from most models.
Several papers, however, have looked at the problem introduced by un-
certain quality and the need for some solution to it— government institutions,
private institutions, or reputations. Falvey (1989) uses a version of the Klein-
Leﬄer reputation model and asks how reputation will aﬀect trade patterns.
The key assumption in that paper, however, is that consumers know the
reputations of domestic ﬁrms but not foreign ﬁrms, which leads to a bias
against imported goods. In the present paper, we will assume that ﬁrms can
take their reputations abroad with them, which will give an advantage to a
4country in which ﬁrms have reputations for high quality.
Chisik (2003) notes that a country will tend to specialize in the goods
for which it has good reputations, and that good reputations increase a coun-
try’s welfare. His model has three features which will not be present in this
paper’s model: (1) Some ﬁrms can produce high quality at lower cost than
others; (2) Firms can signal their quality, though noisily, by a signalling ex-
penditure; and (3) Reputation for high quality is the same for all ﬁrms in
an industry from a given country, pooling together the bottom ﬁrms and the
top ﬁrms in the eyes of foreign consumers. Due to feature (1), a country will
tend to specialize in the high- quality good if its ﬁrms have a technological
advantage in producing it. The reason this is an advance on simple models
of technological advantage is that because quality is unobservable, it is hard
for a company that can product high quality at low cost to convince the cus-
tomers of that. Technological advantage plus reputation is needed. Due to
feature (3), a country should subsidize high quality because the low-quality
ﬁrms are dragging down the country’s general reputation.
Haucap, Wey & Barmbold (2000) combine a reputation model of a mo-
nopolist whose quality type is unobservable to buyers with signalling by
location choice (a model similar in style to the purely domestic production
model of Rasmusen & Perri (2001) in which ﬁrms signal by capital expendi-
ture). The central idea is that only a monopolist with a low marginal cost
for high quality would survive in a high-wage, high-tax country, whereas in a
low-wage, low-tax country such a ﬁrm would be unable to diﬀerentiate itself
from a ﬁrm with a higher marginal cost for quality whose optimal strategy is
to produce low quality and cheat the consumer. Hence, consumers will pay
high prices for high quality from the richer country, but will expect (and get)
low quality from the poor country. Unlike the present paper’s model, that
of Haucap et al. is partial rather than general equilibrium and monopolistic
rather than competitive, but the main diﬀerence is that in the present paper
it will be the ﬁrm’s identity— pure reputation— rather than some signal such
as location that gives consumers conﬁdence that its quality will be high. One
implication of this is that in the present paper’s model, a ﬁrm from the rich
country will be able to retain its reputation for high quality even if it uses
5direct investment to produce in the poor country.
This paper was inspired by Levchenko (2003), which asks the same
question of how institutions aﬀect trade but comes to diﬀerent conclusions.
Levchenko’s starting point is that institutions, modelled as a technological
feature, matter more in some sectors than others. He parameterizes institu-
tional quality following the style of Caballero & Hammour (1998), which in
turn is in the spirit of the contractual incompleteness approach of Grossman
& Hart (1986) and Hart & Moore (1990). Institutions aﬀect not just overall
productivity, but the relationship between diﬀerent factors, whose ability to
contract with each other depends on institutions such as the laws and the
courts. Levchenko starts, as the present paper will, with a model in which
North and South diﬀer in technology, leading to a standard diﬀerence in com-
parative advantage. In Levchenko’s version of this model, the South gains
more than the North from trade. He then develops a Grossman-Hart-Moore
model in which factors are rewarded diﬀerently across industries. Some in-
dustries depend more on institutions, and labor in those industries earns
higher wages. After trade opens up, though, the North’s advantage in those
industries captures those “good jobs” from the South. Levchenko provides
empirical support for the pattern of trade he predicts: the United States im-
ports more from countries that have good institutions, but only in industries
that involve more complicated production.
A similar story and similar empirical ﬁndings can be found in Berkowitz,
Moenius, & Pistor (2003) and Moenius & Berkowitz (2004). As in Levchenko
(2003), the models explore the eﬀect of the quality of a country’s institutions
on its tendency to export or import complex products. Empirical examina-
tion of quality is diﬃcult because of the problem of measuring quality, which
is why these papers look at complexity, which can be deﬁned by looking at
the number of industries that provide inputs to a given product. Another ap-
proach is to look at average prices within industry categories. Thus, Schott
(2001) ﬁnds that richer countries exported to the United States at higher
average prices than poorer countries, and Navaretti & Soloaga (2001) ﬁnd
that European transition economies import equipment at lower average prices
than does the United States. Another approach is pioneered by Hummels &
6Klenow (2002), who use changes in prices over time to extract information
on whether product quality has changed; roughly speaking, if prices rise but
quantities do not, we might deduce that quality has risen. There also exists
a voluminous literature in marketing and international business on “coun-
try of origin eﬀects”; for a survey, see Papadopoulos & Heslop (2002). This
takes a more psychological approach, trying to determine at what stage of
the buying process and to what extent consumers see country of origin as
important, and how that interacts with brand name. One well-known article
in the literature, for example, Johansson & Nebenzahl (1986), uses question-
naires to ﬁnd out how closely consumers link brands to countries and how
much they would pay for cars of a given brand built in a particular country.
They ﬁnd that consumers were willing to pay 14% more for a Buick made in
Germany than for one made in the United States, but 16% less for one made
in Mexico (compared to the U.S.).
The present paper’s focus will be on product quality and the problem
of contracting between buyer and seller rather than on the diﬃculties of
contracting between factors of production. Rather than having both capital
and labor as inputs, the only input will, as in Flam & Helpman (1987),
be labor, although “reputation” will end up behaving like an input despite
being absent from the production function. Unlike in Berkowitz, Moenius,
& Pistor (2003) and Moenius & Berkowitz (2004), countries will diﬀer not
in the public institutions such as courts which try to overcome information
asymmetries, but in private customs. Like Levchenko (2003), I will contrast
a technological model with an information-based model, but the diﬀerences
between the two will not be so striking here. In both models, trade will
beneﬁt both North and South, but the models will diﬀer in such things as
whether Northern ﬁrms beneﬁt from trade, whether the North beneﬁts from
trade with a South too small to aﬀect prices, and the long-term eﬀects of
direct investment.
I will model product quality in two ways. First, I will construct a purely
technological model, in which the advanced country, the North, is able to
produce high quality more cheaply than the South. Second, I will construct
a reputation model, in which the North and South have exactly the same
7technology, but Northern ﬁrms have reputations for high quality and South-
ern ﬁrms do not. For each model, we will compare autarky with free trade,
technology diﬀusion, and direct investment under the two assumptions that
the North is large (the free trade prices are the North’s autarky prices) and
small (the free trade prices are the South’s autarky prices).
2. A Technology Model of Comparative Advantage in Quality Pro-
duction
2a. The Technology Model
There are two countries, the North and the South, and one factor of pro-
duction, labor. Each of the many inﬁnitesimal ﬁrms can hire labor to produce
either of two kinds of goods: the simple good (good 0, our numeraire) or the
reputation good (subscripted L or H depending on quality). The quality of
the simple good is always the same, but the quality of the reputation good
can be either Low or High. The North has 1 unit of labor and the South has
L units. If L>1 we will say the North is Small; if L<1w ew i l ls a yt h e
North is Large. Ownership of labor and ﬁrms (relevant later, in the reputa-
tion model, even though capital is not a factor) is evenly distributed across
the population in each country. Production and trade is repeated in each of
an inﬁnite number of periods, with quality and quantity chosen anew each
period, and the discount rate is r<2 − φ (a constraint relevant later in the
reputation model). Transportation costs are zero, but we will limit ourselves
to those equilibria that require the least transportation.1
One unit of the simple good costs one unit of labor to produce in either
North or South. One unit of the low quality reputation good (quality θL = .5)
costs one unit of labor to produce in either North or South. One unit of the
high quality reputation good (quality θH =1 )c o s t sφ units of labor to
produce in the North, with 1 < φ < 2. Prices will be p0 for the simple good,
1Thus, if the price of the simple good is the same in both countries and each country
produces enough for its entire domestic demand, we will assume there is no intraindustry
trade.
8with p0 ≡ 1 as a normalization, and pL and pH for the low and high-quality
reputation goods.
If x0 is consumption of the simple good and xL and xH are the consump-
tions of reputation goods with low and high quality, a consumer’s utility in





where α < 1, θL = .5, and θH = 1. Low and high quality reputation goods
are perfect substitutes for each other, in the sense that their only diﬀerence
in the utility function is in the multipliers θL and θH.
The assumptions so far will apply to both the reputation model and
technology model. The technology model adds two other assumptions:
(A1) One unit of the high quality reputation good costs φs > 2u n i t so fl a b o r
in the South.
(A2) Consumers observe quality before they purchase.
These assumptions will imply that high quality is eﬃcient in the North
and low quality in the South. In this technology model, information is sym-
metric, and North will produce the high quality reputation good only because
it has a superior technology for producing high quality.
In the technology model, there is no connection between time periods,
since discounting makes consumers wish to consume as early as possible and
there is no uncertainty that might create a precautionary motive for saving.
The model is just a series of unconnected one-period models. The multiple
periods will have importance only in the reputation model, in Section 3.
Note that the high and low quality of the model can apply to services as
easily as to goods. Indeed, it is perhaps even harder to contract in advance
over the quality of services than of goods, and harder to recover damages for
low quality via a lawsuit. Services customers often depend heavily on rep-
utation, whether the service is legal advice, business consultancy, medicine,
or machine repair. Indeed, the customer may not be able to detect low
9quality even for some time after he has “consumed” it. Even much of the
quality involved in goods trade is often most variable in services attached to
the goods, such things as the delay before payment, reliability of delivery,
help in understanding how to operate the good, and advice in packaging and
marketing.
2b. The Technology Model under Autarky
First, what will happen under autarky? In the North, the price of the
simple good will be p0 = 1 (as a normalization), the price of a low- quality
reputation good will be pL = 1, and the price of a high- quality reputation
good will be pH = φ, since prices will equal marginal costs. The wage
will equal w =1 ,a n dﬁrms will earn zero proﬁts, since we assume perfect
competition.
In the South, the price of the simple good will be p0 = 1 (as a normal-
ization), the price of a low-quality reputation good will be pL =1 ,a n dt h e
price of a high-quality reputation good will be pH = φS, since price will equal
marginal cost. The wage will equal w =1 ,a n dﬁrms will earn zero proﬁts.
In summary: prices will be:
South: p0 =1 ,pL =1 ,pH = φS, w =1 .
North: p0 =1 ,pL =1 ,pH = φ, w =1 .
Consumers in each country solve the problem
Maximize
x0,x L,x H U = x
α
0(θLxL + θHxH)
α s.t. x0p0 + xLpL + xHpH = income, (2)
which has the ﬁrst order conditions
αU
x0








− λpH =0 . (5)
































(θLxL + θHxH). (7)
It will not ordinarily be optimal to consume all three goods, however; there




pH. Of the two reputation goods,




pH, and only high quality will be
consumed if the inequality is reversed.







φ, since φ < 2 by assumption, so xL =0a n dxH > 0. We can
rewrite the part of equation (7) that applies to a country that consumes only
the simple good and the high-quality reputation good as
x0 = pHxH. (8)
Since there is one unit of labor in the economy, with a price of w =1 ,
(1)x0 + pHxH =1 ( 9 )













11Half of the North’s labor will be used to produce each good, but the quantity
o ft h er e p u t a t i o ng o o dw i l le n du pl o w e r .




















φS, since φS > 2 by assumption, so xL > 0a n dxH =0 .W e
can rewrite the part of equation (7) that applies as
x0(South)=xL. (13)



























because 2α > φ
α.
Thus, under autarky it is eﬃcient for the North to produce the high-
quality reputation good and for the South to produce low quality. As a
natural consequence of the North having superior technology, it also has
higher welfare.
2c. Opening Up Trade: Large North
Now let us open up trade between North and South. Pricesw will be
equal in North and South, since there is free trade and no transportation
12costs. Since the production function does not have diminishing returns, pro-
duction is constrained only by the amount of labor available, and the free
trade price will equal one of the two country’s autarky price levels, although
wages can diﬀer between the two countries.
We will start with the assumption that the North is Large— that under
free trade, when prices equalize they will equalize at the North’s autarky
level (which will happen if L<1). Under free trade, since North is more
eﬀective at turning labor into reputation goods, the South will specialize in
the simple good. Because the North is Large, it will be able to absorb all the
simple good the South wants to export without any change in prices.
T h en e ww o r l dp r i c eo ft h es i m p l eg o o dw i l lb ep0 = 1 (as a normal-
ization), the price of a low-quality reputation good will be pL =1 ,a n dt h e
price of a high- quality reputation good will be pH = φ. In the North and
South alike, the wage will equal wS = wN = 1. Firms will earn zero proﬁts.
To sum up: free trade prices (Large North) will be p0 =1 ,pL =1 ,pH = φ,
wS =1 ,wS = wN =1 .
The South will produce only the simple good, some of which it will
export to the North. The North will produce both goods, and export some
of the reputation good to the South.
T h e s ew i l lb et h ep r i c e sb e c a u s et h e r em u s tb eas i n g l ew o r l dp r i c ef o r
the traded goods, and since, as we will see below, the North will be producing
both the simple good and the high-quality reputation good in equilibrium,
for ﬁrms to earn zero proﬁts it must be that the high-quality good, requiring
φ units of labor to the simple good’s 1 unit, must have a price φ times as
high. Since the simple good is produced in both countries, and using the
same amount of labor in each, for ﬁr m st oe a r nz e r op r o ﬁts also requires that
t h ew a g eb et h es a m ee v e r y w h e r e .









The South’s prices have changed to become equal to the North’s so its









Thus, consumption of the simple good is unchanged in the South. Consump-
tion of the reputation good has fallen, but it has changed from low to high
quality, and since high quality adds twice as much to someone’s utility as
low quality, utility has risen in the South.
We can now see what determines when the North is “Large”. The South
will produce only the simple good, producing a quantity of L. The North
will be importing L/2 of the simple good from the South. That is why L<1
deﬁnes the case of “Large North”. If L is any larger, then the North will not
wish to import as much of the simple good as the South wishes to export at
the equilibrium prices. The South wishes to export half of its production of
t h es i m p l eg o o d ,s oi fi fL = 1, the South wants to export L =1 /2, which
is all the North wishes to purchase at equilibrium prices. The North will
export L/2φ of the reputation good to the South.
We have found that in the technology model, when trade is opened up
and the North is large relative to the South, the price of the reputation good
falls in the South. Thus, the North’s welfare is unaﬀected, but Southern
consumers are now better oﬀ.
2d. Opening Up Trade: Small North
Suppose, instead, that we open up trade between North and South under
the assumption now that the North is Small (L>1). The North is more
eﬀective at turning labor into reputation goods, so the South will tend to
14specialize in the simple good. But the South will not specialize completely.
Instead, the North will specialize completely, in the high-quality reputation
good, while the South will produce both the simple good and the low-quality
reputation good.
The world price of the simple good will be p0 = 1 (as a normalization),
the price of the low-quality reputation good will be pL =1 ,a n dt h ep r i c eo f
the high- quality reputation good will be pH = 2. This last is true because in
equilibrium, both the low-quality and the high-quality reputation good will
be consumed in the South, and if the price of the high-quality good were
less than pH = 2, there would be excess demand for the high-quality good,
pushing up its price.
Wage will equal wS =1a n dwN = 2
φ > 1. At these levels, ﬁrms will
earn zero proﬁts; a unit of the simple good or the low- quality reputation
good costs (1)wS in the South and earns a price of p0 =1o rpL =1 ;au n i t
of the high-quality reputation good costs φ units of labor at wN per unit in
the North and earns a price of pH =2 .
To sum up: free trade prices (Small North) will be p0 =1 ,pL =1 ,pH =2 ,
wS =1 ,wS =1 ,w N = 2
φ > 1.
The South will produce the simple good and the low-quality reputation
good, and will export some of the simple good to the North. The North will
produce just the high-quality reputation good, and will export some of it to
the South.2
2This is just one possible pattern of trade, though the most plausible one. Since we have
assumed zero transportation costs, and since consumers are indiﬀerent between the low-
quality good and the high-quality good at the equilibrium prices, there are other equilibria
with the same prices but with diﬀerent distributions of where the low-quality reputation
good is consumed. It could be, for example, that in equilibrium the North exports all of its
high-quality reputation good production to the South in exchange for imports of the simple
good and of the low-quality reputation good. Inﬁnitesimal positive transportation costs
would, however, eliminate any equilibrium in which the South exported the low-quality
reputation good to the North.
15Equation (8) tells us that
x0 = pHxH. (19)
Now with pH = 2, and Northern production equal to 1/φ units of the high-
quality production good, Northern national income is equal to pH(1/φ)=
2/φ, and equation (9) becomes
(1)x0 + pHxH =2 /φ, (20)
















Because of trade, the wage and the price of the high-quality good have risen
in the North. Consumption of the high-quality reputation good is unchanged
from the autarky level of xH = 1
2φ, but consumption of the simple good has
risen from x0 =1 /2t ox0 = 1
φ,s ot h eN o r t hb e n e ﬁts from trade. Note,
however, that if there did exist a Northern consumer without wage income,
that consumer would be hurt by trade, since he would see the price of the
reputation good rising without any increase in his income.
The North produces amount 1/φ of the high-quality reputation good,
1/φ− 1
2φ = 1
2φ of which is exported to the South in exchange for (2)( 1
2φ)=1
φ
o ft h es i m p l eg o o d .T h u s ,xH(South)= 1
2φ.
The South is now consuming both low and high-quality reputation goods.
From equation (7),
x0(South)=2 ( .5xL(South)+xH(South)) (23)
so




16Since Southern income is wLL = L,
(1)x0 + pHxH + pLxL = L, (25)












































Compared to autarky, the South has not changed its consumption of the
simple good. It has reduced its consumption of the low-quality consumption
good from xL = L
2 to L
2 − 1
φ and increased its consumption of the high-
quality consumption good from xH =0t oxH = 1
2φ, but this has no impact
on utility, since each unit consumed of the high-quality good has double the
utility eﬀect of each unit of the low-quality good.
Thus, if the South is large and trade opens up, the North beneﬁts be-
cause its wage rises, but the South is unaﬀected.
2e. The South’s Technology Improves
What happens if the South develops a better technology— that is, if φS
falls towards but not beyond φ?
If the North is Large, there is no eﬀect. The North is still better at
producing high quality, and the price remains at φ.
17If the South is Large, however, then once φS < 2, pH starts falling as
φS falls. The price of the North’s high quality good will be pH = φS,a n d
once φS < 2, the South will stop producing the low quality good and start
producing its own high- quality goods. The Northern wage will start falling
too. In combination, this means Southern welfare rises and Northern welfare
falls.
2f. Direct Investment by the North in the South
What happens if the Northern ﬁrms engage in direct investment in the
South, combining their superior technology with the cheaper Southern labor?
In the present model, the eﬀect is simple: since Northern ﬁrms compete with
each other, their proﬁts are zero, and the eﬀect is just to enable the South
to the same pattern of production of the North. Trade is no longer useful.
If the North is Large, this does not aﬀect either country’s welfare. If the
North is Small, though, the eﬀect of direct investment is that the Northern
wage falls back to 1. Welfare in the North falls, and welfare in the South
rises. This is just a special case of the Southern improvement in technology
that we just discussed, with φS dropping to equal φ because of Northern
investment.
The North has an interest in banning direct investment and technology
transfer to the South. Its ﬁrms end up with zero proﬁts anyway, since the
compete with each other, and it loses the scarcity value of its labor. All
it gets is the prestige value of Northern company nameplates on Southern
products. The result is reminiscient of the celebrated “immiserizing growth”
of Bhagwati (1958), in which a country’s growth in output ruins its terms
of trade when its producers engage in perfect competition and do not hold
back output to maintain the price. Here, the problem is that the Northern
producers compete the price of technology down to zero.
If, for some reason, the rate of Northern direct investment was slow in
the Small North case, or if it is permanently restricted, then this conclusion
must be modiﬁed, because Northern ﬁrms could earn positive proﬁts during
18the transition period. Those that inve s t e di nt h eS o u t hw o u l db er e c e i v i n g
ap r i c eo fpH = 2 while paying a wage of only wS = 1 instead of the higher
wage their competitors in the North pay. If this were the case, then Northern
ﬁrms would favor direct investment, while Northern workers would oppose it.
Northern welfare might well be higher overall if direct investment is allowed,
because the combination of Northern technology and Southern cheap and
plentiful welfare creates the most world social surplus, and if Northern ﬁrms
are limited in how much they can sell, they retain this surplus. Even if
eventually Northern direct investment grows to where it reduces pH and wN,
the discounted value of the transition proﬁts might exceed the discounted
value of the permanent high wN that would result if direct investment were
banned.
The idea of direct investment brings us to another problem with the
technology model, a well-known one. How can technological diﬀerences per-
sist? Why doesn’t everyone just use the best technology? The survey of
Keller (2004) suggests some answers. Reasons such as the need to embody
technology in capital investment or human capital are reasonable enough,
but the rest of the paper will examine a possible reason why the South might
lack high quality even if technology is freely transferable.
3. The Reputation Model
We’ll next compare the technology model with a model in which pro-
duction technologies are identical in North and South, but reputations diﬀer.
Keep the same model as in Section 2, except
(A1’) One unit of a high quality reputation good costs the same φ > 1
units of labor to produce in the South as in the North: φS = φ now.
(A2’) Consumers cannot observe the quality of a good before purchase
in period t, but they do observe the quality of the goods everyone purchased
in period t − 1, and they know which ﬁrms sold the goods.
(A3’) Northern producers of reputation goods have good reputations,
but Southern producers of reputation goods do not.
19Assumption (A3’), which will be made meaningful shortly, becomes rel-
evant because Assumption (A2’) introduces the possibility of multiple equi-
libria. “Reputation” will be the term used to distinguish between the most
interesting equilibria.
3a. The Reputation Model under Autarky
The reputation model is essentially a general equilibrium and mathema-
tized version of the idea presented in Klein & Leﬄer (1981) (or, in a diﬀerent
context, in Telser [1980]). Their object was to explain two things (1) why
some ﬁrms produce high quality even when consumers cannot tell quality
before purchase, and (2) why ﬁrms that produce high quality often seem to
be able to charge a price higher than cost even in a market with free entry. In
their article, these proﬁts are explained as a return to the ﬁrm’s reputation
for high quality, a reputation not easily acquired.
Here we are using a formalization of the Klein-Leﬄer model similar to
what I have used before in Rasmusen (1989) and Chapter 5 of Rasmusen
(2001), interpreting it as an inﬁnitely repeated game between consumers and
ﬁrms. The present model adds international trade and competition among
ﬁrms for the input, labor, but makes ﬁrms inﬁnitesimal and without ﬁxed
costs.
Since the interaction between consumer and ﬁrms selling the reputation
good is inﬁnitely repeated, there are multiple equilibria. We will focus on
two of them.
In the “pessimistic equilibrium,” quality is low and pL =1 ,e q u a lt o
its cost because of competition among ﬁrms. The price for high quality,
pH,i su n d e ﬁned because high quality cannot be credibly produced. The
equilibrium strategy for a ﬁrm is to produce low quality. The equilibrium
strategy for a consumer is to pay at most a price of 1 for a reputation good,
regardless of the claims the seller makes about quality. The players stay with
these strategies regardless of deviations by other players.
These strategies form a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium for the re-
20peated game. No ﬁrm has an incentive to produce high quality, since it will
not be able to get any higher price. If it did produce high quality once, con-
sumers would be surprised, but the equilibrium calls for the ﬁrm to return
to producing low quality in the next period, so the consumers would not be
willing to switch to paying a higher price for that ﬁrms’ goods. Rather, they
w o u l dr e g a r dt h ed e v i a t i o na saﬂuke, not to be repeated.
The pessimistic equilibrium is the only equilibrium for the one-shot game
(or for the ﬁnitely repeated game, due to the Chainstore Paradox— see Chap-
ter 5 of Rasmusen [2001]) for details). It can be seen as a variant of the
Prisoner’s Dilemma, or the Trust Game: both ﬁrms and consumers could
be made better oﬀ if the ﬁrms were forced to choose high quality and the
consumers were willing to pay higher prices, but without compulsion, neither
side will take the risk.
In the inﬁnitely repeated game, however, there are many equilibria, of
which we will focus on the pessimistic equilibrium and the one at the other
extreme, the “optimistic equilibrium”.
In the “optimistic equilibrium”, quality is high. For this to be true, a
ﬁrm must fear punishment if it produces low quality instead. The punishment
would be a damaged reputation: consumers believe that the ﬁrm will produce
low quality in the future and they switch to another ﬁrm instead.
The equilibrium strategy for a reputable ﬁrm is to produce high quality
unless it has ever deviated and produced low quality, in which case it produces
low quality thereafter. The equilibrium strategy for a consumer is to buy from
ar e p u t a b l eﬁrm charging a price of exactly p∗ (to be calculated below), but
not to buy if the price is higher or lower, and not to buy if the ﬁrm has ever
been caught producing low quality. We will focus on the most eﬃcient of the
optimistic equilibria, the one in which p∗ takes the lowest value possible that
sustains the equilibrium.
Here is how we ﬁnd the equilibrium price, p∗.I ft h eﬁrm produces high


















but if it produces low quality, the present value of its proﬁts is
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We will focus on the equilibrium with the lowest price that satisﬁes this







For it to be worth buying the high-quality good at this price instead of simply




22or, if w =1 ,
φ − r<2 − 2r (38)
so
r<2 − φ, (39)
which is true by assumption.
We will focus on the optimistic equilibrium in which competition among
ﬁrms pushes the price down to the minimum level of p∗ that induces high
quality production.3
Thus, in equilibrium the prices in the North are p0 =1 ,a n dpH = p∗
and quality is high for the reputation good. The wage will be wN =1 .
Firms producing the simple good will earn zero proﬁts; ﬁrms producing the
reputation good will earn positive proﬁts.
That proﬁts are positive for ﬁrms producing high-quality reputation
goods in the optimistic equilibrium is important. It is only because their
prices are higher than their costs that buyers can trust them to produce high
quality, so positive proﬁts are an intrinsic part of the equilibrium. This is
a disturbing feature of the model, and one that the original article, Klein
&L e ﬄer (1981) tries to downplay. These positive proﬁts could be quasi-
rents— returns on an initial sunk investment in reputation. Or, they could be
entry costs unrelated to reputation, as in Rasmusen (1989) or Chapter 5 of
Rasmusen (2001), or initial investments that signal private information, as in
Perri & Rasmusen (2001). But sunk costs that make a ﬁrm’s lifetime proﬁts
equal to zero are not part of the logic of the model. The model does not have
to specify a mechanism for reputation creation. Since it is one equilibrium of
many, reputations can arise arbitrarily, as a result of expectations, and they
3There is a continuum of other optimistic equilibria in which prices are even higher. In
these equilibria, if, out of equilibrium, consumers see a price less than the high equilibrium
level, they infer that the ﬁrm charging that price intends to produce low quality. They do
not buy from him as a result, even in the present period, so even if his quality is really
high, he has no chance to prove it. Such equilibria seem implausible, and are in any case
irrelevant to the point we are trying to make here.
23will be self-fulﬁlling. The ﬁrms with good reputations can simply be lucky.
That holds true in the present model too: we need not inquire into why
some Northern ﬁrms have good reputations and earn positive proﬁts while
others do not. It will be important to the welfare results, however, that
when demand increases in the market because of exports, the extra proﬁts
that result are not eaten up by new ﬁxed costs of some kind. If, for example,
when the market increases, new ﬁrms with good reputations can enter at a
ﬁxed cost, then that will dissipate all of the new proﬁts.
Thus, we will assume that in the North the market for the reputation
good has the most eﬃcient optimistic equilibrium, in which suﬃcient ﬁrms
have good reputations, and the proﬁts which maintain those reputations are
at the lowest feasible level. In the South, on the other hand, we will assume
that all ﬁrms selling the reputation good are in the pessimistic equilibrium.
They will produce low quality and sell it at pL =1 .
Under autarky, the outcome is very similar to what we saw in the tech-
nology model. Prices of the simple good are the same in both countries, but
reputation goods are more expensive and of higher quality in the North, and
welfare is higher in the North than in the South.
Demand can be derived from the utility functions as before. A distortion
is introduced because the price of the reputation goods exceeds their social
cost. Anything that would reduce the price of those goods (to closer to their
social cost) while maintaining high quality would reduce that distortion—
for example, laws that punished false claims of high quality, even if only
erratically.
We can also compute out the amount of income that goes to labor and
the amount that goes to reputation. Thef o r mo fa n a l y s i so fq u a n t i t i e sp r o -
duced would be the same as in the technology model, except for two things.
First, price for the high-quality good will be p∗ instead of φ. Second, na-
tional income must now reﬂect proﬁt as well as wage income. Unlike in the
technology model, the high price pH = p∗ does not reﬂect a real production
cost: the amount pH−φw is proﬁt ,n o te x t r al a b o rn e e d e df o rh i g h e rq u a l i t y .
24This means that the outcome even in the North will not be the ﬁrst
best. Too much of the simple good will be produced and consumed relative
to the high-quality reputation good. This is nonetheless a better outcome
than if the high-quality reputation good were not produced at all.
We have seen that under autarky prices in the reputation model will be:
South: p0 =1 ,pL =1 ,pH = undefined, w =1 .
North: p0 =1 ,pL =1 ,pH = p∗ =
(φ−r)
1−r , w =1 .
The equilibrium consumption and utility in the South under autarky is









The North is slightly more complicated, because now national income
contains proﬁta sw e l la sw a g e s .T h ev a l u eo fg o o d sp u r c h a s e di sp0x0+pHxH,
as before. Income, however, includes not just wages, equal to w times the one
unit of labor, but proﬁt, which equals xH times the pH minus the unit cost
of the labor used to produce high quality. Thus, for the North the budget
equation is
p0x0 + pHxH = w(1) + (pH − φw)xH. (41)
This implies p0x0+(pH −pH +φw)xH = w,s oo n c ew es e tw =1a n dp0 =1 ,
x0 + φxH =1 , (42)
which is identical to what came out of the technology model’s budget con-
straint. The technology model’s derivation of demands based on relative
prices remains applicable here, but now pH −p∗ instead of pH = φ. The bud-
get constraint and the real cost of the high-quality good have not changed,
but the price of the high quality good is higher. Since p∗ < 2, North-
ern consumers will buy only the high-quality good. Equation (8) says that
x0 = pHxH, so we can conclude that
















Since p∗ > φ, the North’s per capita consumption of the simple good is
higher than the South’s (which is 1/2). Since both φ and p∗ are less than
2, the North also gets more utility from its consumption of the reputation
good: (2) 1
φ+p∗ > 1/2.
Thus, as in the technology model, in the reputation model the North’s
utility is higher than the South’s under autarky due to the higher quality of
its reputation goods.
Though the North does better than the South, however, it does not at-
tain the ﬁrst-best, though for reasons unrelated to lack of free trade. The
need to keep prices high to ensure quality results in ineﬃciently low con-
sumption of the high-quality good in the North. Observe also the curious
diﬀerence from the technology model that the North has some of its national
income going to ﬁr m sa sp u r ep r o ﬁt, even though all ﬁrms are capable of
producing the exact same products and even though they compete in price.
Though there is no diﬀerences in factor endowments or production func-
tions, under autarky the South’s consumption of the high-quality reputation
good is even more ineﬃcient than the North’s— it is zero, despite lack of any
technological barrier to production. Consumers do not trust Southern ﬁrms
to produce high quality, and this mistrust is self-conﬁrming.
3b. Opening Up Trade: Large North (L<1)
Now let us open up trade between North and South. We assume that
ﬁrms retain their reputations when they engage in international trade (for
the implications of the opposite assumption, see Chisik [2003]).
In equilibrium, the South will only produces the simple good, some
of which it exports. The North will produce both goods, and export the
26reputation good. Northern ﬁrms gain. Southern consumers gain. Southern
and Northern wages are unchanged. Southern ﬁrms are unaﬀected, earning
zero proﬁts.
Prices will be p0 =1 ,pL =1 ,pH = p∗, wN = wS =1 .
T h en e ww o r l dp r i c eo ft h es i m p l eg o o dw i l lb ep0 = 1 (as a normal-
ization), the price of a low-quality reputation good will be pL =1 ,a n dt h e
price of a high-quality reputation good will be pH = p∗. In the North and
South alike, the wage will equal wS = wN = 1. Northern ﬁrms that produce
high-quality reputation goods will have positive proﬁts, which will increase
with trade; other ﬁrms will have zero proﬁts.
The South will produce only the simple good, some of which it will
export to the North. The North will produce both goods, and export some
of the reputation good to the South.
These prices result because there must be a single world price for the
traded goods and the North will be producing both the simple good and the
high-quality reputation good in equilibrium. Its price for the high- quality
good must therefore be the minimimum which is accepted by consumers as
a sign of high quality, which is the p∗ we derived under autarky. Since the
simple good is produced in both countries, and using the same amount of
labor in each, for ﬁr m st oe a r nz e r op r o ﬁts also requires that the wage be the
same in North and South.
The South’s prices have changed to become equal to the North’s. This
means that consumption of the low-quality good, with a price of pL =1 ,
will fall to zero, since that is more than half the price of the high-quality
good, pH = p∗. As a result, equation (8) from Section 2 tells us that the
South’s consumption proportions will be the same as the North’s: x0 =
pHxH = p∗xH. The South’s consumption levels under trade are lower than
the North’s under autarky however; we cannot just point to equation (44)
above as being the South’s consumption when the North’s prices become
the world prices. The reason is the budget constraint: under autarky, the
North’s national income includes the proﬁts from the high-quality good, but
27under trade, the South’s national income does not. Instead, the South’s
national income derives solely from labor: wL. Thus, its budget constraint is
p0x0+pHxH = wL or x0+p∗xH = L. Solving this out using the consumption







This yields higher per capita utility than the South’s consumption of xL(South)=
L/2a n dx0(South)=L/2 under autarky, if not as high as the North’s con-
sumption of xH(North)= 1
φ+p∗ and x0(North)=
p∗
φ+p∗. The South is better
oﬀ under trade even though a careless observer, not correcting for quality,
might complain that the Southern consumer was now paying more for the
reputation good and that part of Southern labor was in eﬀect being shipped
overseas to become part of the proﬁto fN o r t h e r nﬁrms.
We can now determine the level of trade. The South produces none of
the reputation good and L of the simple good, exporting L/2t ot h eN o r t h
and consuming the rest. The North exports the South’s entire consumption
of the high-quality reputation good, xH(South)= L
2p∗.
We have seen that one diﬀerence from the technology model is that in the
reputation model with a Large North trade does not result in the South’s per
capita consumption rising all the way to the North’s level. Another diﬀerence
is that even a Large North will gain from trade (as opposed to its welfare
remaining unchanged), something that did not happen in the technology
model. Let us next look at what happens to the North’s consumption under
trade.
Prices in a Large North do not change as a result of trade, which is
why its welfare did not change in the technology model. In the reputation
model, however, the North earns proﬁts from its export of high-quality goods.
Thus, while trade gives the South new prices, it gives the North a new budget
constraint. The North’s exports are xH(South)= L
2p∗, and on each unit of
export, a proﬁto fp∗ − φwN is earned, which is a total export proﬁt( w h i c h
28we shall denote as πx)o f
North
0sE x p o r tPr o fi t≡ πx =
L(p∗ − φ)
2p∗ (46)
Observe that this increases in p∗, though if p∗ ever went above p∗ =2 ,t h e
South would switch to the low-quality good and Northern export proﬁtw o u l d
fall to zero.4
The free trade equivalent of (??), the North’s autarky budget constraint,
is therefore
p0x0 + pHxH = w(1) + (pH − φw)xH +
L(p∗ − φ)
2p∗ (47)
Equation (8) tells us that the North’s consumption proportions will be un-
changed from autarky: x0 = pHxH = p∗xH. Thus, consumption can be found
simply by modifying the autarky levels from (44) to include consumption of
the extra proﬁti n c o m e :
xL(North)=0 xH(North)=
1
φ + p∗ +
πx
φ + p∗ x0(North)=
p∗




The North’s utility has risen as a result of trade, but through higher income,
not lower prices.
To summarize: if the North is Large, then when trade is opened up, it
beneﬁts both North and South. The South gains the ability to consume high
quality, while the North gains proﬁt from increased sales of the high-quality
reputation good, even though its price does not rise. The gain to the South
was found in the technology model also; the gain to the North was absent
there. A secondary result is that free trade does not raise the South’s welfare
t ot h es a m ea st h eN o r t h ’ s ,w h e t h e rw e compare it to the North’s autarky
4If a rise in the discount rate caused the price to rise above this limit of p∗ =2 ,
exporters could not succeed in keeping their customers by voluntarily restraining their
prices. As always in the optimistic reputation equilibrium, the high prices are not caused
by the greed of the ﬁrms, but the prudence of the consumers, who know that a ﬁrm with
too low a price has too little incentive to produce high quality.
29welfare or free trade welfare. The reason is that a country beneﬁts from
being the one producing the high-quality good, since its ﬁr m st h e ne a r nt h e
positive proﬁts from it.
3c. Opening Up Trade: Small North (L>1)
Now let us assume that it is the North that is Small, so the South’s
autarky prices become the world prices under free trade.
Prices will be p0 =1 ,pL =1 ,pH =2 ,wS =1 ,wN =
(2−2r
φ−r > 1.
If the North is Small, then in equilibrium it will specialize completely in
the high-quality good, some of which it will export to the South. The South
will produce both the low-quality good and the simple good, some of which it
exports to the North. Since the South is producing both goods, zero proﬁts
requires that pL =1a n dpH = 2. Since the South is producing the simple
good, wS =1 .
What about the Northern wage? Inequality (35) said that the price of
the high-quality good had to be high enough that a ﬁrm would not sacriﬁce







When the North is Small, pH is set by competitive conditions in the South,
so pH = 2. If the Northern wage remained wN =1 ,h o w e v e r ,t h i sw o u l d
yield proﬁts to the Northern ﬁrms in excess of those necessary to sustain
high quality. To reduce proﬁts to the minimum necessary requires that (35)
be satisﬁed as an equality. Before, we took w = 1 and solved for pH.N o w ,










30For the small r that we assume, this says that the Northern wage rises as a
result of trade Northern ﬁrms and workers both gain from trade. Northern
consumers lose. Southern consumers win.
Next, let us look at production and trade quantities. The North spe-
cializes completely in the high-quality good, some of which it will consume
and some of which it will export to the South. Since the North has 1 unit of
labor and each unit of the high-quality good requires φ in labor, its output
will be 1/φ units of the high-quality good. Unlike in Section 3b’s equation
(47), it is now easiest to write the North’s budget constraint in terms of total
proﬁt, rather than summing domestic proﬁta n de x p o r tp r o ﬁt:




so x0 +2 xH = wN +
(2−φwN)
φ and x0 +2 xH = 2
φ. Equation (8) tells us that









Compare this with the autarky consumptions from equation (44) of xH =
1
φ+p∗ and x0 =
p∗
φ+p∗. Consumption of both has increased with trade (since
p∗ > φ), so Northern welfare has risen.
The South’s welfare is the same as under autarky. It consumes the same
amount of the simple good, and although it now consumes some of the high-
quality good, the price is so high that Southern consumers are indiﬀerent
between it and the low-quality good.
Northern welfare is higher than under autarky, for two reasons. First,
the price of the high-quality good has risen from p∗ to 2, which beneﬁts the
North through an increase in the wage. Second, Northern sales of the high-
quality good have increased, and each unit yields a positive proﬁtt ot h eﬁrm
that sells it. Thus, Northern welfare rises.
Qualitatively, there is no great diﬀerence between the reputation model
and the technology model for the Small North case. In both models, trade
31raises the price of high quality in the North, the North exports it to the
South, both high and low quality are consumed in the South, and the North
sees a rise in welfare while the South’s welfare is unchanged.
3d. Southern Firms Improve Technology or Reputation.
In the technology model, technological progress in the South has imme-
diate eﬀe c t so np r i c e si ft h eS o u t hi sL a r g ea n dd r a m a t i ce ﬀects on trade if
the South catches up the North, regardless of relative size.
A striking implication of the reputation model is that the technology
available to the South is unimportant. The model begins with equal tech-
nologies in North and South: φs = φn = φ.W h a ti fw er e d u c e dt h eS o u t h ’ s
cost of producing high quality slightly, so it became superior to the North?
Nothing in the model would change. If the Southern ﬁrms have poor reputa-
tions, then consumers do not care that the ﬁrms could produce high quality
at low cost— the question is whether they would actually do so, and in a pes-
simistic equilibrium, they would not. An improvement in technology would
only help the South if it were so extreme that φs < 1, which is to say that high
quality became cheaper to produce than low quality. If that happened, then
even ﬁrms with poor reputations would switch to high quality, of course.
Thus, unless the improvement in technology is extreme, if the reputation
model applies it would be a waste of eﬀort for ﬁrms or governments in the
South to try to improve production technology. The problem is in trust, not
technology.
If, on the other hand, the Southern ﬁr m sd i dd e v e l o pg o o dr e p u t a t i o n s ,
trade would become unnecessary. The South could produce the high-quality
good, and if consumers switched their loyalty, the proﬁts ﬂowing to ﬁrms
with good reputations would ﬂow to Southern ﬁrms instead of Northern
ﬁrms. Clearly, this helps the South and hurts the North, whether the North
is large or small.
3 e .D i r e c tI n v e s t m e n tb yt h eN o r t hi nt h eS o u t hi nt h eR e p u t a t i o n
Model
32What if the Northern ﬁrms can combine their good reputations with
Southern labor?
In the Large North case, such direct investment has results similar to
free trade. Direct investment can replace export of the high-quality good
from the North to the South, and the South would no longer specialize in
the simple good, but prices and welfare would be the same whether Northern
ﬁrms with their good reputations produce the good in the North or in the
South. Whether the Northern ﬁrms use exports or direct investment, they
pay the same wages, use the same production function, and earn the same
proﬁts.
In the Small North case, direct investment does have a diﬀerent eﬀect
from trade, because it overcomes the bottleneck of the limited supply of
Northern labor. If direct investment is possible, Southern and Northern
labor compete head-to-head, so their wages cannot be diﬀerent, and Northern
workers do not have the high wages generated by trade.
Northern ﬁrms would still earn their positive proﬁts under direct invest-
ment, and these would in fact rise, but not merely because direct investment
allows them to pay lower wages to produce the high- quality good. It does,
but the lower wages also result in lower prices, as the ﬁrms compete prices
down to the minimum necessary to sustain high quality. The price of the
high-quality good will not be pH =2 ,a sw i t ht r a d e ,b u tpH = p∗,a si nt h e
North under autarky. The ultimate eﬀect will be to increase the proﬁts of
the Northern ﬁrms, but only because the lower price will result in greater
Southern consumption of the high-quality good. The Northern ﬁrms’s proﬁt
rises because of greater volume, not because of a higher mark- up.
If the South is much larger than the North, direct investment can be far
more proﬁtable for the North than trade,b e c a u s et h ea d v a n t a g ei np r o ﬁts
will dominate the disadvantage in wages. From the Southern consumer’s
perspective, the Small North case with direct investment looks just like the
Large North case with free trade, because prices will adjust to the North’s
autarky levels, and though production of the high-quality good will increase
in the South, all the proﬁts will go to the North. Thus, consumption will be







The North will be earning proﬁts of p∗ − φ per unit on the southern
production of xH(South)= L
2p∗, for a total proﬁt from direct investment of
North
0s direct investment profit =
(p∗ − φ)L
2p∗ . (54)
If the North is only slightly smaller than the South (L is just above 1)
and the quality-inducing markup is small (p∗ − φ is small) then the North’s
proﬁts from direct investment are small and its workers’ wage gains from
trade were large. In that case, direct investment reduces the price drastically
from pH =2t oa l m o s tpH = φ, and the North would be better under trade
than using direct investment.
If, on the other hand, the North is much smaller than the South (L is a
large multiple of 1) and the quality inducing markup is high (p∗−φ is large)
then the North’s proﬁts from direct investment are high and its workers’
wage gains from trade were small. Direct investment reduces the price only
slightly, from pH =2t oap∗ near 2, the wage falls only slightly in the North,
but Northern ﬁrms are able to produce and sell a much greater quantity
in the South. In that situation, direct investment would enhance Northern
welfare much more than trade.
4. Summary and Concluding Remarks
The models used here were deliberately simple. The technology model,
with its one factor, two goods, and perfect information is perhaps the simplest
possible way to model diﬀerences in quality across countries. Its drawback is
that technology transfer seems to be too easy to be the only thing at work
to explain why quality diﬀers across countries. The reputation model raises
the complexity level slightly, by providing a reason why ﬁrms would be able—
in fact, required— to mark up prices above cost for high-quality goods, and
34for those goods alone. Technology transfer no longer can bring the South up
to the North’s level of production; what is needed is reputation transfer.
In many ways the the technology andr e p u t a t i o nm o d e l sh a v et h es a m e
implications. In both, quality under autarky is higher in the North than the
South, and opening up trade results in Northern exports of the high-quality
good to the South. If the North is Large, its autarky prices determine world
prices and wages under free trade, and Southern consumers beneﬁtw h i l e
Northern consumers and workers everywhere are unaﬀected. If the North is
Small, the South’s autarky prices determine world prices under free trade,
and Southern consumers derive no beneﬁt but Northern workers see a rise in
wages.
There are diﬀerences in the implications of the two models, however,
chieﬂy arising from the positive proﬁts the Northern ﬁrms earn from the high-
quality good in the reputation model even in competitive markets. Because
of these positive proﬁts, a country beneﬁts more if its ﬁrms produce the high-
quality good than the low-quality good or the simple good, and expanding
the market always helps, even if it does not change the terms of trade. Thus,
Northern ﬁrms beneﬁt when trade is opened up, even if the North is Large.
This eﬀect also provides a second reason, besides higher wages, why a Small
North beneﬁts from opening up trade. Since it is the Northern ﬁrms that
earn the proﬁts, another implication is that opening up trade will not lift the
South to the North’s level of prosperity, even if Southern consumers now pay
prices just as low as Northern consumers.
Perhaps the most striking implications are in the areas of technology
diﬀusion and direct investment. In the technology model, the South’s con-
sumption pattern becomes identical to the North’s if either Southern ﬁrms
acquire Northern technology or Northern ﬁrms take their production South.
Moreover, technology diﬀusion and direct investment both leave the North ei-
ther unaﬀected, or hurt it, by reducing Northern wages. The problem for the
North is that technology diﬀusion eliminates its advantage, and competition
among its ﬁrms reduces any proﬁts they might earn from direct investment.
In the reputation model, the eﬀects are diﬀerent. Technology diﬀusion is
35irrelevant, because the South’s problem is not poor technology, but poor
reputations. What Southern ﬁrms need is to be able to acquire the Northern
ﬁrms’ reputations, a less straightforward problem. Direct investment will,
as in the technology model, equalize wages in North and South. But North-
ern ﬁrms cannot compete away their proﬁts, because zero markups over cost
would destroy their reputations; price competition is limited to keeping the
markup at the minimum necessary for consumers to trust that the ﬁrms have
the incentive to produce high quality. Thus, even in the long run, direct in-
vestment would beneﬁt Northern ﬁrms— and potentially beneﬁt the North
much more than trade, since trade is limited by the number of Northern
workers able to produce the high-quality good.
A question unaddressed in this paper is how a ﬁrm develops a reputation
in the ﬁrst place. Perhaps like innovation, it requires investment in a ﬁxed
cost. In that case, spreading the ﬁxed cost over more markets gives added
incentive to invest in reputation. Or it could just be a matter of historical
luck. Expectations in the North were optimistic, and sellers developed good
reputations and sold high- quality goods .O r ,i tc o u l db eam a t t e ro fs o c i a l
capital more generally: internal principles or a tradition of government en-
forcement of honesty leads to optimistic equilibria even where guilt and the
police do not have the ability to induce good behavior. Reputation could be
endogenized in a variety of ways, with diﬀerent implications for policy.
If reputation is combined with one of the diﬀerentiated product models
commonly used in trade models, we might imagine some ﬁrms in a growing
South acquiring good reputations in the new products that are developed,
rather than having to compete head-to-head with Northern ﬁrms. On the
other hand, if competition is head-to-head and both reputation and technol-
ogy are endogenous, Southern ﬁrms might be trapped in a situation where
their technologies are so inferior that they could not compete at equal prices
even if they somehow developed good reputations, but investing in technol-
ogy by itself would also be useless.
Models are metaphors, this one perhaps more than most. In broad
terms, the reputation model is showing how important reputation can be—
36behaving, even, like another factor of production. A nation with a greater
endowment of the factors of production will have higher utility, and a greater
endowment of reputation is no diﬀerent in that respect. Unlike most factors,
however (though like technology and information generally), reputation is
a nonrivalrous input: a ﬁrm with a good reputation can expand its output
without extra cost, including expanding it to a diﬀe r e n tc o u n t r y .T h a tm a y
be too strong a claim— reputation can be conveyed at zero cost in this model,
but in the real world, consumers do need to learn of a ﬁrm’s reputation, even
if the reputation is already established for most consumers. But it does ring
true that a ﬁrm with the valuable attribute of a reputation for good quality
will have lower costs of extending that reputation to new markets than a ﬁrm
that must start from scratch.
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